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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy
quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to,
essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the
journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and
The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist
philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925–69. The
pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers
systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalize rival
approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the
growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and
allows characterizing this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925–69, a
sectarian form of critical philosophy.
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1. Introduction
The present paper argues that analytic philosophy, at least during the period
1925–69, was a form of critical philosophy that used institutional control in
order to promote itself and marginalize rivals. This institutional control, it
will further be argued, partly explains the emergence and eventual domi-
nance of analytic philosophy in Great Britain and the United States of
America. More specifically, already documented takeovers of the journals
Mind and The Philosophical Review (PR) by analytic philosophers (Katzav and
Vaesen, ‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’ and ‘Pluralism and
Peer Review’) are here shown to be part of a pattern. The pattern is of philo-
sophers with a shared commitment to a form of critical philosophy either (a)
founding journals that are dedicated to promoting that form of critical philos-
ophy or (b) using journals with a history of openness to diverse philosophical
approaches to promote that form of critical philosophy at the expense of
© 2018 BSHP
CONTACT Joel Katzav uqjkatza@uq.edu.au
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2018.1450219
rivals. It is this use of journals which, in turn, plays a role in explaining the
emergence and dominance of analytic philosophy.
I provide evidence for the above mentioned pattern by examining the
changing contents of philosophy journals and trying to learn about the
causes of these changes from the composition of journal editorial boards.
In Section 2, I outline the classification system I use in classifying journal
papers. Following earlier work of mine with Krist Vaesen (‘Emergence of Amer-
ican Analytic Philosophy’ and ‘Pluralism and Peer Review’), this system divides
philosophical approaches in America and Britain into speculative and critical
ones, with, e.g. classical pragmatism, absolute idealism and process philos-
ophy being classified as speculative and analytic philosophy being classified
as critical. Importantly for what follows, phenomenology and existentialism
will be taken to have critical and speculative variants.
Section 3 presents a classification of the contents of The Journal of Philos-
ophy (JoP) during the period 1950–69. We will see that its contents change in
two stages. The first change occurs in 1958, when JoP goes from being a plur-
alist journal, that is, one that is open to the various forms of speculative and
critical philosophy available in America at the time, to being a journal that,
although still open to existentialism and phenomenology, was focused on a
form of critical philosophy, namely mid-century analytic philosophy. The
1958 change only impacts the pages of the journal in 1962, for reasons that
will become clear. The second change is the exclusion of phenomenology
and existentialism from JoP after 1963. As we will see, the two shifts in JoP’s
contents are attributable to two changes in its management. The first
change in management is the appointment of Robert D. Cumming – whose
work was in the history of phenomenology and existentialism – as journal
editor. The second change is the appointment of the analytic philosophers
Arthur C. Danto, Sydney Morgenbesser and James J. Walsh as journal
editors in 1964.
Section 4 situates the occurrences at JoP, and the similar occurrences at
Mind and PR, in a broader context. I provide, in less detail than was done
for JoP, an overview of the contents of what can be viewed as the ‘generalist’
philosophy journals operating in America and Britain during the 1940s and
1950s, that is, of philosophy journals that then catered to most of the special-
izations in subject matter of academic philosophers in these countries. The
journals include, in addition to the three already mentioned journals, Analysis,
Philosophical Studies (PS), Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research (PPR), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (PAS), The Philosophical
Quarterly (PQ) and The Review of Metaphysics (RM). Relevant journals which
were founded in the 1960s are also covered, including American Philosophical
Quarterly (APQ), The Southern Journal of Philosophy (SJP) and Noûs. The over-
view illustrates the founding of analytic philosophy only journals by analytic
philosophers (APQ, Analysis, Noûs, PS), the use of control of historically pluralist
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journals in order to marginalize non-analytic philosophy (Mind, PR, JoP and
PQ), and the continued existence of (generalist) pluralist journals after 1950
only under the management of non-analytic philosophers (SJP, JoP prior to
1958, PQ prior to 1957, PPR until 1980 and RM). The overview also allows an
understanding of the limited journal publication options available to non-ana-
lytic philosophers in the late 1940s, the 1950s and the 1960s, and a consider-
ation of how these options contributed to the growth of analytic philosophy.
Finally, the overview allows considering other candidate contributors to this
growth, including contributors that, like those uncovered here, are primarily
independent of argumentation (external contributors) and those that are
not independent in this way (internal contributors). With regard to external
contributors, I provide evidence for thinking that McCarthyism had a
limited role in driving the growth of analytic philosophy. With regard to
internal contributors, my discussion suggests that there was no adequate jus-
tification for the sectarian attitudes found in analytic philosophy in the
decades during which it came to dominance in Britain and America.
In Section 5, I discuss what the examination of journal contents, and the
way in which analytic philosophy became dominant in Britain and America,
might teach us about the nature of analytic philosophy. I consider the form
of critical philosophy that analytic philosophy was, how its attitude to other
approaches to philosophy might have been underpinned by a commitment
to critical philosophy and whether it was also characterized by dogmatism
about philosophical approach, that is, by a level of commitment to its
approach that was not justified by available evidence or argumentation.
The conclusion, in Section 6, summarizes my claims about the growth and
nature of analytic philosophy, and relates these claims to alternative pictures
of analytic philosophy.
2. Classifying British and American philosophy during the
period 1925–69
According to Katzav and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philos-
ophy’, 774), the distinction between speculative and critical philosophy is
the most fundamental distinction between approaches to philosophy made
by authors in PR in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. The same is true of authors
writing elsewhere in Britain and America during this period (see, e.g.
Stedman, ‘A Defence of Speculative Philosophy’; Reichenbach, The Rise of
Scientific Philosophy; Collins, ‘A Quarter Century of American Philosophy’;
Dewey, ‘The Future of Philosophy’ and Lowe ‘Categorical Analysis’). Speculat-
ive philosophy, as understood at the time, tends to focus on the provision of
substantial, general claims about the natures of the universe and its human
occupants. Moreover, it provides such claims in a way that is epistemically
independent of established beliefs, including those of science and common
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sense. Critical philosophy tends to avoid making claims that are independent
in this way and, instead, tends to describe or make explicit/reconstruct the
commitments of existing, established beliefs. Speculative philosophies will
tend to include a critical philosophy as a component.
The methodologies associated with speculative philosophy include devel-
oping views of reality on the basis of a priori principles, dialectical investi-
gation that takes its starting point from common sense and science but
that goes beyond both, and observation based theorizing. The methodologies
associated with critical philosophy are the varieties of analysis, including epis-
temological, linguistic and logical analysis. In addition, speculative philosophy,
unlike analytic philosophy, is thought of as being inherently concerned with
drawing practical and normative conclusions.
While Katzav and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’)
only explicitly characterize critical and speculative approaches to philosophy
in terms of tendencies to make certain types of claims, these approaches can
also be characterized in terms of views about how philosophy should be done.
Authors in PR, JoP and elsewhere (see, e.g. de Laguna, ‘Speculative Philos-
ophy’, Frankena, ‘Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century’ and the references two
paragraphs above) make it clear that, according to speculative philosophy,
philosophy should provide its own distinctive substantive claims. Similarly,
according to critical philosophy, philosophy should avoid going beyond
established belief.
Speculative philosophical approaches were, during the period under con-
sideration, taken to include absolute idealism, classical – that is, Peircean,
Jamesian and Deweyan – pragmatism, process philosophy, Thomism, (some
variants of) neo-Kantian philosophy and more. Critical philosophy was taken
to include new and critical realism, logical positivism, and early and mid-twen-
tieth-century analytic philosophy. Mid-twentieth-century analytic philosophy
differs from its analytic predecessor primarily by being broader; by mid-twen-
tieth century, analytic philosophy incorporates ordinary language philosophy,
the ideas of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, and ideas from logical positivism
and pragmatism.
A complication that matters to what follows concerns the classification of
phenomenology and existentialism in America of the 1950s and 1960s. Katzav
and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’, 775) follow writers
in PR and classify these approaches as speculative. This perspective is sup-
ported by Edie’s 1964 survey of what was then recent work in American
phenomenology. He characterizes American phenomenology as ‘aiming to
contribute to a foundational study of man and, in doing so, going
“beneath” the “objectivistic” categories introduced from the natural sciences’
(Edie, ‘Recent Work in Phenomenology’, 116). However, some phenomenolo-
gists during the period we are concerned with do think that philosophy
should be a purely critical enterprise. Thus, for example, Marvin Farber, the
4 J. KATZAV
founder of PPR, is critical of the phenomenological movement on the whole
and, indeed, thinks (Kim, ‘Marvin Farber and Husserl’s Phenomenology’)
that what is of value in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy is a critical methodology,
namely the method of eidetic analysis and description.
As we will see, some critical work that was neither phenomenological nor
existentialist had a real place in JoP in the 1950s but not after about 1963. This
work included, for example, work in modern Indian philosophy and will be
classified as non-analytic (at least by 1960s standards). My motivation here
is the relative absence of the work from the journal after 1963 and the
work’s sympathy for what were then, from the journal’s perspective, non-stan-
dard forms of analysis or unfashionable, including speculative, authors.
3. The Journal of Philosophy: 1950–69
3.1. 1950–61: pluralism
JoP’s contents during the period 1950–61 nicely illustrate the above classifi-
cation of approaches to philosophy into critical and speculative varieties.
During these years, work in critical philosophy in JoP includes (work stan-
dardly classified as) analytic philosophy, but extends to critical work in phe-
nomenology and existentialism; critical, including analytic, contributions to
the journal are also made by speculative philosophers. Speculative philosophy
appears regularly in the journal and does so in a variety of forms. These
include classical pragmatism, absolute idealism, process philosophy, speculat-
ive phenomenology, speculative existentialism, Thomism and eclectic
approaches. In terms of diversity, JoP in this period is similar to PR in the
1940s, though some important differences exist. Most notably, as Katzav
and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’, 781) note, classical
pragmatism is the most prominent form of speculative philosophy in JoP of
the 1950s, but is not so in PR of the 1930s and 1940s.
Analytic contributions in JoP include ordinary language philosophy (e.g.
Ambrose, ‘Linguistic Approaches to Philosophical Problems’ and Ebersole,
‘On Certain Confusions’) and logical empiricism (e.g. Nagel, ‘On the
Method of Verstehen’ and Feigl, ‘Other Minds and the Egocentric Predica-
ment’), but also a variety of other analytic approaches, as is seen in the cri-
ticism of ordinary language philosophy’s methods and results (e.g.
Chisholm, ‘Comments on the “Proposal Theory”’ and Danto, ‘Concerning
Mental Pictures’). Methodologically, while much analytic philosophy in the
journal focuses on analysing language usage, other work involves, among
other things, conceptual analysis and reconstruction (e.g. Putnam, ‘Psycho-
logical Concepts’ and Chisholm, ‘Comments on the “Proposal Theory”’) and
epistemological analysis (e.g. Kyburg, ‘The Justification of Induction’ and
Wellman, ‘Our Criteria’).
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Classical pragmatist work in JoP of the 1950s and early 1960s does exhibit
the speculative tendency to develop its own perspective about people and
the world. For example, Parsons (‘Dewey’s Religious Thought’) argues for a
Deweyan, speculative methodology for the philosophy of religion and Suits
(‘Naturalism: Half Hearted or Broken Backed’) argues for the viability of
aspects of Dewey’s speculative philosophy of nature. Pragmatist papers do,
however, often have a critical focus (e.g. Bernstein, ‘John Dewey’s Metaphysics
of Experience’). Particularly prominent is Deweyan pragmatism (see the refer-
ences just provided), but pragmatist papers also draw on Charles S. Peirce (e.g.
Murphree, ‘Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry’), George H. Mead (e.g. Natanson,
‘George H. Mead’s Metaphysics of Time’) and George Santayana (e.g. Corey,
‘Some Notes on the Deliberate Philosophy’), among others.
Non-pragmatist speculative papers in the journal include papers that are
influenced by Alfred N. Whitehead (e.g. Hartshorne, ‘Process as an Inclusive
Category’ and Bakan, ‘On the Subject-Object Relationship’), absolute idealism
(e.g. Cotton, ‘Royce’s Case for Idealism’), Thomism (e.g. Mourant, ‘Cartesian
Man and Thomistic Man’) and other less familiar speculative philosophical
approaches (e.g. Krikorian, ‘Sheldon’s Synthetic Metaphysics’; Pepper,
‘Natural Norms in Ethics’ and Doan, ‘Notations on G. H. Mead’s Principle of
Sociality with Special Reference to Transformation’). Non-pragmatist speculat-
ive papers also include work in phenomenology and existentialism, as we will
see.
In addition, the tie between speculative approaches and practical concerns
is something that is recognized regularly (e.g. Gray, ‘Heidegger’s “Being”’ and
Burtt, ‘The Core of Dewey’s Way’). Papers with concrete normative impli-
cations are also to be found, and these are rarely by analytic philosophers. Par-
ticularly notable papers with concrete normative implications include three
from 1951 and 1952, one of which is by the pragmatist Sydney Hook, one
by the critical realist Arthur O. Lovejoy and one by the process philosopher
Victor Lowe. Hook and Lovejoy argue that members of the communist
party are, as such, disqualified from being professors in academia, and
Lowe criticizes the position taken by Hook and Lovejoy (see Capps, ‘Pragma-
tism and the McCarthy Era’ for more on the exchange).
Papers that are not in phenomenology or existentialism, but do focus on
these approaches, often sympathetically, regularly appear in JoP (e.g. Gray,
‘Heidegger’s “Being”’ and Seyppel, ‘A Comparative Study of Truth’). So do
papers in existentialism and/or phenomenology (e.g. Wild, ‘Tendency’;
Tillich, ‘The Nature and Significance’ and Champigny, ‘Translations from the
Writings’, which includes work by Jean-Paul Sartre). In the early 1960s, some
phenomenology in JoP is speculative (see the appendix) while some argues
that phenomenology should be a critical enterprise (Farber, ‘The Phenomen-
ological Tendency’; Gurwitsch, ‘The Problem of Existence’ and Schmitt, ‘Phe-
nomenology and Metaphysics’).
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Some JoP papers engage with the history of Western philosophy and/or
with a wide variety of then contemporary approaches to philosophy (e.g.
Sommers, ‘The Passing of Privileged Uniqueness’ and Smith, ‘Experiential
Foundations of Religion’). In addition, some volumes showcase what was
then contemporary European philosophy (e.g. the special edition on Polish
philosophy (57(7)) and the edition that contains the already mentioned
work by Sartre). However, work in non-Western philosophy does not appear
in JoP; by contrast, Katzav and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Phil-
osophy’, 777) document such work in pre-1950s PR. Indeed, the vast majority
of JoP authors write from America, though some were modern Indian philoso-
phers who were located in India and whose papers were in critical philosophy
(e.g. Krishna, ‘The Moral and the Axiological Ought’; Raju, ‘Actuality’; and
Devaraja, ‘Notes Towards a Definition of Philosophy’).
Specialist areas of philosophy which are represented in the journal include
the philosophy of science, the philosophy of economics, political philosophy,
the philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of
history, the history of philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics,
metaphilosophy and more.
3.2. 1962–69: two abrupt changes
JoP’s contents change quickly after 1961. During the period 1950–60, the non-
analytic, non-historical (i.e. non-analytic, critical and speculative) papers in the
journal on any given year comprise roughly between 40% and 50% of the
journal’s papers,1 with almost all of the rest of the papers in the year being
analytic papers. Roughly 70% or more of the non-analytic, non-historical
papers in any given year were speculative; there were sixteen such papers
in 1955 and twenty one in 1956. In 1961, the journal still publishes nineteen
papers which can be classified as speculative. There are five further papers
which can be classified as non-analytic, critical papers. In total, this amounts
to about 40% of the papers in the journal in that year (see the appendix). In
1962, however, there is one paper which can be classified as speculative
and another two which can be classified as critical, non-analytic papers. The
non-analytic, non-historical papers in this year are approximately 5% of the
papers in the journal (see the appendix). In 1963, about 20% of the papers
are non-analytic, non-historical papers and in 1964, about 10% (see the
appendix). The years 1965–69 are akin to 1962, with non-analytic, non-histori-
cal content at about 5%; 1965, for example, only includes two papers that
might be classified as non-analytic (see the appendix). Analytic papers
1My estimate is based on the percentages of non-analytic, non-historical papers in 1955 (≈40%) and 1956
(≈50%), years which seem to contain, respectively, relatively low and relatively high numbers of non-
analytic, non-historical papers. Note that here, and in what follows, I am referring to full-length
papers, including contributions to American Philosophical Association symposia.
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 7
during this period come to comprise almost all that JoP publishes. One thing
that does not change during the late 1950s, and at least the first half of the
1960s, is the nature of analytic philosophy in JoP; it is aptly termed mid-twen-
tieth-century analytic philosophy.
Phenomenology and existentialism appears to maintain its presence in JoP
until 1963, but basically comes to be excluded from the journal from 1964.
During 1964–67, for example, only two papers in the journal (both of which
are critical papers and appear in 1965) might be classified as phenomenolo-
gical or existentialist in their approach. By contrast, nine papers can be classi-
fied as either phenomenological or existentialist during 1961–63, including
five speculative papers (see the appendix).
The journal also ceases – much as PR did when it became an analytic
journal a decade earlier (Katzav and Vaesen, ‘Emergence of American Analytic
Philosophy’, 778) andMindmore or less did after 1926 when it became hostile
to speculative thought (Katzav, ‘The Disappearance of Modern Indian Philos-
ophy’) – to publish papers by philosophers in India; this occurred despite the
fact that the JoP papers these philosophers published in the 1950s were criti-
cal and, indeed, were neither phenomenological nor existentialist. Plausibly,
the work was still not close enough to mid-twentieth-century analytic philos-
ophy for 1960s JoP. Thus, for example, Krishna’s ‘The Moral and the Axiological
Ought’ paper is a contribution to linguistic philosophy, but would stand out in
post-1961 JoP because it appeals to the cultural context of language in analys-
ing meanings (similar considerations apply to, e.g. Devaraja, ‘Notes Towards a
Definition of Philosophy’).
Not surprisingly, which individuals publish in JoP also changes in the early
1960s. In particular, some speculative philosophers whose publishing careers
extend well after 1962–63 and who publish in JoP regularly prior to these
years, cease to do so in later years. Examples include Gail Kennedy, Max
Rieser and John Wild (the appendix provides references to some of their
JoP work).
3.3. Proximate causes of the changes at The Journal of Philosophy
Given the speed of the changes at JoP, they must have been driven by edi-
torial policies. A note by Danto marking the death of Cumming in 2004
helps to identify the policies’ authors. Danto writes:
[A]ll of us have reason to be grateful to Bob for his service as editor of the
Journal, from 1958–1964, for it was he who took the steps necessary to trans-
form it into the important journal of professional philosophy that it became
through his measures. Bob inherited an immense backlog of papers that had
been accepted in an act of recklessness by one of his predecessors, and he
insisted that until all this was published, no further papers could be accepted.
When space had at last been made for new contributions, he imposed the
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highest standards, using prompt publication as an incentive. When the level he
deemed suitable was attained, he withdrew, leaving the publication in the hands
of younger philosophers. Interestingly, he had no particular interest in the kind
of professional analytical paper through which the Journal made its reputation.
His philosophical tastes and values were entirely Continental, and his heroes
were Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.
(Danto, ‘In Memorium’, 607)
If Danto is correct about who controlled the content of JoP during the years
1958–64, then it is plausible to suppose that Cumming was responsible for
the standards by which JoP papers were judged during these years and
thus was responsible for the changes that then occurred in the journal. This
ﬁts with JoP’s front matter; it tells us that Cumming was editor from 1958
until June 1964 (Vol. 61(13)). The moratorium decided upon by Cumming
thus also went along with a decision that – with the exception of speculative
existentialist and speculative phenomenological work – basically excluded
accepting speculative papers for publication in JoP. Although the moratorium
meant that this decision only became visible in 1962, it was presumably made
in 1958. The front matter also reveals that the younger philosophers who were
on the editorial board from 1964 were Sidney Morgenbesser, Arthur Danto
and James J. Walsh. It thus seems that these three were responsible for main-
taining the changes initiated by Cumming and for further narrowing down the
focus of the journal in 1964, including effectively excluding phenomenology
and existentialism from the journal.
Attributing responsibility for JoP content from 1964 onwards to Danto and
Morgenbesser fits well with their analytic approach to philosophy (see, e.g.
Danto, ‘Concerning Mental Pictures’ and ‘What We Can Do’) and Morgenbes-
ser, ‘Fodor on Ryle and Rules’ respectively). Walsh was primarily a historian of
medieval philosophy, but his non-historical work (e.g. Walsh, ‘Remarks on
Thought and Action’) reveals a clear analytic orientation. Things are more
complex when it comes to Cumming. He too was primarily a historian of phil-
osophy. But, as Danto notes, Cumming’s work was on, and his sympathies
were with, phenomenology and existentialism. Why, then, did he help to
promote analytic philosophy at the expense of speculative philosophy?
Most plausibly, Cumming shared the already noted opposition to speculative
philosophy that was prominent among some of those working in phenomen-
ology. Indeed, although the historical nature of Cumming’s late 1950s work
makes his approach to philosophy at the time hard to discern, his focus
was on the work of Søren A. Kierkegaard and Sartre, and he pits these thinkers
against a ‘disintegrating philosophical tradition’ that has Hegel – whose work
is central to much Anglo-American speculative philosophy – as its pivotal
figure (‘Existence and Communication’, 98). Another possibility is that the
young philosophers who officially took over the journal in 1964 already had
substantial influence on the journal prior to 1964; this possibility is in
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tension with Danto’s letter but fits the fact that analytic philosophy was the
primary beneficiary of the 1962 changes in JoP.
Three other philosophers were, according to JoP’s front matter, among
its editors in 1958. Since all three were editors prior to 1964, Danto’s
letter suggests that they were not involved in driving the changes in
JoP’s contents. Indeed, it is independently implausible that they were.
George L. Kline, whose role as editor is coextensive with that of
Cumming, was a speculative philosopher (see, e.g. Kline, ‘Spinoza East
and West’). The remaining two editors were Herbert W. Schneider and
John H. Randall Jr. Both had been editors throughout the 1950s and thus
are unlikely to have participated in initiating the changes in the journal.
Further, Schneider ceases to be recognized as an editor in 1962, precisely
when the character of the journal is visibly transformed. Schneider is also
a speculative philosopher (see, e.g. Schneider, ‘Metaphysical Vision’).
Randall Jr. does continue to be named as an editor until the end of
1966; at that point, his editorial position comes to be described as honor-
ary. But he is a speculative philosopher with little respect for analytic phil-
osophy (see, e.g. Randall, ‘Talking and Looking’).
Finally, Danto claims that Cumming was responsible for an improvement in
the quality of the papers in JoP as well as for making the journal’s reputation.
But an improvement in the reputation of JoP in the 1960s would, at most,
make sense from the perspective of analytic philosophers; JoP was the most
prominent journal still open to non-analytic philosophers in the 1950s and
among the three most prominent journals in America and Britain (see
Section 4). As for the claim that the standard of work in the journal improved
in the early 1960s, this is perhaps correct by the mid-twentieth-century stan-
dards of analytic philosophy. Yet these standards were clearly in dispute
between non-analytic and analytic approaches to philosophy. I consider
what justification there might have been for preferring the standards of ana-
lytic philosophy below.
4. The contents of generalist philosophy journals in Britain and
America (1925–69), and the effects of these contents
There is evidence (Katzav and Vaesen, ‘Pluralism and Peer Review’) that ana-
lytic editors by and large exclude non-analytic philosophy from Mind from
roughly 1925 onwards; a notable exception was made for new and critical
realism while it still had force in the 1930s. There is also evidence (Katzav
and Vaesen, ‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’) that analytic
editors basically excluded non-analytic philosophy from PR from 1948
onwards. Section 3 allows adding that, plausibly, JoP closed its doors to
non-analytic philosophy in 1958, even if this only became visible in its
pages in 1962. Thus, by the end of the 1950s, the three most prominent
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philosophy journals in Britain and America were dedicated to analytic
philosophy.2
Katzav and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’) also
note that the changes in PR probably pushed young academics in the direc-
tion of analytic philosophy at a time when there was substantial growth in
American philosophy.3 Presumably, the changes in JoP and the established
sectarian attitudes at Mind enhanced this effect. Partly, the effect is likely to
have been a direct result of the prestige of the involved journals; what they
presented to young philosophers was a world of philosophy which, by and
large, identified serious philosophy with analytic philosophy. In addition,
however, the end of the Second World War saw a period during which pub-
lishing became important to getting and keeping an academic position (Nee
and Ingram, ‘Embeddedness and Beyond’).
In order to get a more complete picture of the impact of the kind of sectar-
ianism found at Mind, PR and JoP, we need to examine the contents of other
generalist journals in Britain and America. I do so first by focusing on the
period 1940–59 and then, more briefly, on the period 1960–69. In Britain of
the 1940s and 1950s, the only established, generalist academic philosophy
journals other than Mind were Analysis, Philosophy and PAS.4 Analysis, which
was founded in 1930, was an analytic philosophy only journal from the
outset. PAS only published papers annually and thus provided relatively
little space. In addition, its papers were invited and were, by the 1950s, domi-
nated by analytic philosophy (see the abstracts compiled by Scott (‘A Synoptic
Index’)). Philosophy was, during the period under consideration, open to non-
analytic philosophy, but it was founded in 1926 by the British Institute of Phi-
losophical Studies – later named the Royal Institute of Philosophy – partly in
order to bring philosophy to a wide audience (see the editorial statement in
vol. 1(1)). As a result, its articles were relatively popular and short; plausibly, it
was not the place to establish an academic reputation.
PQ was founded in 1950 by the speculative philosopher Thomas M. Knox
and was then open to speculative philosophy (Katzav and Vaesen, ‘Emergence
of American Analytic Philosophy’) and to analytic philosophy. However, PQ
2Support for assuming the mid-twentieth century prominence of Mind, PR and JoP is provided by Katzav
and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’, 773) as well as by considering which estab-
lished, generalist philosophy journals were available at the time. As what follows makes clear, PPR was,
leaving aside the relatively lightweight Philosophy, the only other established, generalist journal in
Britain and America of the 1950s which published non-invited, full-length papers. PPR, however, was
only founded in 1940 and had a base in a niche in American philosophy, namely phenomenology.
This suggests that the journal had comparatively limited influence.
3The membership of the American Philosophical Association rose from 1248 in 1950 to 2725 in 1970
(Soames, ‘Analytic Philosophy in America’). Taking this growth rate to reflect the overall growth rate
in the number of American academic philosophers implies that the number of academic philosophers
in 1970 was roughly 2.2 the number in 1950.
4Here, and in what follows, claims about which generalist journals were available are based on Inter-
national Directory of Philosophy and Philosophers (1965) and The Directory of American Philosophers
(1972), along with a consideration of journal contents.
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was not an established journal in the early 1950s. Moreover, its pluralism
about philosophical approaches was short-lived. The ordinary language philo-
sopher Anthony D. Woozley (see, e.g. Woozley, ‘Ordinary Language and
Common Sense’) assists Knox in editing the journal in 1956 and becomes
the journal’s editor in 1957 (see PQ’s front matter for these years); the
journal is basically an analytic only philosophy journal from 1957. Ratio was
a British–German journal founded in 1957 under the editorship of Julius
Kraft, but it published relatively few papers in its first decade – for example,
it only published fifteen papers during 1957–59 – and (Hacohen, Karl
Popper, 121) was an anti-Hegelian journal that aimed to promote critical phil-
osophy, in a Kantian sense of ‘critical philosophy’.5
In America, PPR of the 1950s was a relatively established venue for publi-
cation, albeit one that was not as prestigious as Mind, PR or JoP. Moreover,
while PPR was the organ of the International Phenomenological Society and
did place particular emphasis on work in phenomenology and existentialism,
it published speculative philosophy that was neither phenomenological nor
existentialist as well as analytic philosophy; it also catered to a wide range
of areas of specialization within philosophy. It can thus plausibly be viewed
as a venue that was generalist.
The only other American venues which might be thought of as generalist
were PS and RM. But PS was dedicated to analytic philosophy from its found-
ing in 1950. RM was, by contrast, pluralistic and particularly open to non-ana-
lytic, including speculative, philosophy. Yet, RM was established in 1947 and
thus was a fledgling journal for some of the period at hand. Building a repu-
tation for a pluralistic journal at a time during which the main players were
predominantly analytic would have been hard, though RM’s base at Yale (Cas-
tiglione, ‘Weiss, Paul’) could have somewhat compensated for this.
In summary, during the period 1949–59, non-analytic philosophy was
allowed substantial space only in two established generalist, American jour-
nals, that is, JoP and PPR – and only one of these (JoP) was among the
three most prominent journals in America and Britain. This space – not
much more than the equivalent of one journal – was supplemented by
space in the fledgling RM. The destinations for non-analytic philosophy are
further reduced after the 1958 changes in JoP. In Britain, Philosophy and PQ
had space for non-analytic philosophy, but PQwas a fledgling journal the plur-
alism of which only lasted until 1957, and Philosophy was a relatively light-
weight journal. On the other hand, analytic philosophy had, throughout the
period being considered, virtually all of Mind, PR, Analysis and PS to itself
(though note the thinness of the volumes of the last two of these journals)
5The Hibbert Journal was British and did provide limited room for philosophy, including speculative phil-
osophy, but it had a much broader focus than philosophy or academic research, and ceased publication
in 1956.
12 J. KATZAV
as well as substantial room in JoP, PPR, RM, PQ and Philosophy; in the late
1950s, PQ became an analytic journal and analytic philosophers are likely to
have learnt of what was brewing at JoP (see Table 1 for the situation in
1959). Restrictions on journal space thus placed very substantial limits on
the visibility, prestige and publication of non-analytic philosophy and
helped to push philosophers in the direction of analytic philosophy.
The 1960s did not see a reversal in the sectarianism of the journals that
were, by the end of the 1950s, focused on analytic philosophy. To be sure,
one generalist, pluralist journal, namely SJP, is founded in 1964, early
enough in the 1960s to have an impact on the trajectory of philosophy
during this decade. But SJP was not only a fledgling journal, it was also
open to analytic philosophy and provided very limited space in comparison
with what was already available in sectarian journals at the time. A second
generalist journal, APQ, is founded in 1964, but it only occasionally publishes
non-analytic philosophy.
Let me make five more points before concluding this section. First, the sec-
tarian attitudes at Mind, PR and JoP were part of a pattern. Generalist journals
under the control of analytic editors in America and Britain are, during the
period under consideration, essentially only open to analytic philosophy.
The changing contents of PQ fit this pattern, as do the prominent analytic
editors, and corresponding contents, of Analysis and PS (Analysis is edited
by Margaret MacDonald during 1948–56, and PS’s founding editors are
Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars). APQ’s founding occurs before its editor,
Nicholas Rescher, moves away from analytic philosophy (Rescher,
Autobiography, 161–2). Noûs too (contrary to its front matter) was dedicated
to analytic philosophy from its founding under the editorship of Hector-Neri
Castañeda – an analytic philosopher (Rapaport, ‘Castañeda, Hector-Neri’) –
in 1967. RM and PPR remain open to a variety of philosophical approaches,
but their editors are not analytic philosophers. RM is founded by Weiss,
who was a speculative philosopher (Castiglione, ‘Weiss, Paul’) and who
remains editor there until 1964, when another speculative philosopher,
Table 1. Generalist, academic philosophy journals in America and Britain and their
openness to publishing analytic and non-analytic papers (1959).
Journal Analytic Non-analytic
Mind +
The Philosophical Review +
The Journal of Philosophy +
Analysis +
The Philosophical Quarterly +
Philosophy + +
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society +
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research + +
The Review of Metaphysics + +
Philosophical Studies + (1950–)
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Bernstein, takes over the journal (Hogan, ‘Bernstein, R. J.’). Farber edits PPR
from its founding in 1940 until his death in 1980, when the journal is taken
over by the analytic philosopher Roderick Chisholm (Chisholm, ‘Comments
on the “Proposal Theory”’); under Chisholm, non-analytic philosophy has a
token presence in the journal, often in the form of exegetical work on
Husserl or Heidegger.6 SJP’s founding editor is William B. Barton Jr., a specu-
lative philosopher (see, e.g. Barton, ‘Review of Whitehead’s Metaphysics’).
And while my focus has been on pre-1970s generalist journals, the case of
PPR suggests that, at least to some extent, the pattern described here contin-
ued beyond the 1960s (to offer a further potential illustration, The Personalist,
which was renamed Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in 1980, appears quickly to
have transitioned into an analytic philosophy dominated journal in the early
1970s, after it came to be edited by the analytic philosopher John Hospers
(Rasmussen, ‘John Hospers and the Activity of Philosophy’) in 1968. Takeovers
of at least some specialist journals also occurred. Don A. Howard shows (‘Two
Left Turns Make a Right’) that Philosophy of Science becomes a journal for ana-
lytic philosophy of science when it is taken over by the logical empiricist
Richard Rudner in 1959.
Second, Katzav and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’)
suggest that, in the case of the takeover of PR, speculative philosophers’ plur-
alism about philosophical approaches may partly explain why analytic philo-
sophers were given editorial roles. The broader picture provided above
suggests that pluralism may have also had a stage-setting role at other Amer-
ican journals. As we have seen, pluralist journals (in America and Britain) did
not, prior to being taken over by analytic philosophers, generally exclude work
in analytic philosophy from their pages. Nor did they exclude analytic philo-
sophers from participating in the editorial process. Thus, JoP’s front matter
tells us that the analytic philosopher Ernest Nagel served as one of its
editors during the period 1939–56. PR had the analytic philosopher Richard
Robinson as an editor in the 1940s while it was still a pluralist journal
(Katzav and Vaesen, ‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’, 783).
Now, the openness of speculative philosophers could in principle help to
explain why analytic philosophers got in through the door. And the sectarian
attitude of relevant analytic philosophers would then help to explain why,
once they had sufficient control, they let nobody else in.
6Chisholm writes:
I had told Farber that I would try to make the journal conform to the original plans he had had in
founding it. I took this to mean that it would be especially receptive to the kinds of philosophical
question that have been emphasized by philosophers in the tradition of Brentano and Husserl and
that the journal should be primarily concerned with philosophy and not with other disciplines.
(‘Self-Profile’, 13)
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Third, in addition to sectarianism at philosophy journals, sectarianism in
teaching at PhD-awarding philosophy departments and in hiring philosophers
(independently of their records of publication) is likely to have substantially
affected the trajectory of philosophy in Britain and America. It is clear, for
example, that a number of prominent American PhD-awarding departments
came quickly to be dominated by analytic philosophers during the late
1940s and the 1950s, including, among others, the Sage School of Philosophy
at Cornell University (Katzav and Vaesen, ‘Emergence of American Analytic
Philosophy’), the philosophy department at UCLA (McCumber, The Philosophy
Scare) and the philosophy department at Harvard (Soames, ‘Analytic Philos-
ophy in America’). This, plausibly, would have reduced the willingness of
the departments in question to hire non-analytic philosophers as well as
steered PhD students at these schools in the direction of analytic philosophy.
Similar effects have been document at the University of Oxford after the
Second World War (Akehurst, The Cultural Politics of Analytic Philosophy).
Fourth, Katzav and Vaesen (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’)
observe that the takeover of PR by analytic philosophers in the late 1940s pre-
dates the main pressures of the McCarthy era, and thus that it – along with any
tension that might have existed between it and practice oriented speculative
philosophy – is not a plausible explanation for these changes. The changes at
JoP also do not seem to be explained by an appeal to McCarthyism. They
begin in 1958, which is already after the height of the McCarthy era, and
are implemented and reinforced in the 1960s. Indeed, we have seen that ana-
lytic philosophy’s sectarianism continues throughout the 1960s in a wide
variety of American venues, as well as that it extended to Britain. This suggests
that the changes in America depended on less local factors than McCarthyism
(see also Hollinger, ‘Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics’). In addition, speculative
American philosophy continued to be prominent in American philosophy
during the McCarthy era. Perhaps this was because speculative philosophy
could steer away from practical issues that might have then been viewed
with suspicion, perhaps because (recall the case of Hook) it could fit comfor-
tably with McCarthyism and perhaps because (recall Lowe’s criticism of Hook)
McCarthyism was limited in its influence.
Finally, my investigation of journal contents, and associated non-journal lit-
erature, suggests that there was no case that might justify the sectarianism I
have been describing. One does find some direct criticism of speculative phil-
osophy as such during the period 1920–60 (e.g. Ayer, ‘Demonstration of the
Impossibility of Metaphysics’; Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, ch. 1;
Ryle, ‘Taking Sides in Philosophy’; Stace, ‘Can Speculative Philosophy be
Defended?’; Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy; and Hampshire,
‘Metaphysical Systems’). Moreover, speculative philosophers do repeatedly
respond to this criticism (e.g. Stedman, ‘A Defence of Speculative Philosophy’;
Pepper, World Hypotheses; Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking; Hahn,
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‘Metaphysical Interpretation’; Harris, ‘Scientific Philosophy’; and Blanshard, ‘In
Defense of Metaphysics’). However, these responses are not, as far as I can tell,
addressed by the criticism of speculative philosophy. There thus does not
appear to be even the beginning of an extended exchange between
approaches to philosophy that might justify a sectarian form of critical
philosophy.
Let me illustrate – and I can here do no more than illustrate – the lack of
engagement with defences of speculative philosophy. Speculative philosophy
was most often objected to on the ground that it concerns what is beyond any
possible empirical evidence and rests on purported synthetic a priori knowl-
edge (see, e.g. Ayer, ‘Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics’;
Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, ch. 1; Ryle, ‘Taking Sides in Philosophy’;
Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, ch. 18; and Hampshire, ‘Meta-
physical Systems’). As speculative responses make clear, this objection
ignores many speculative philosophers’ explicit commitment to fallibilistic
forms of empiricism (see, e.g. Whitehead, Process and Reality; Stedman, ‘A
Defence of Speculative Philosophy’; Pepper, World Hypotheses; Emmet, The
Nature of Metaphysical Thinking; and Hahn, ‘Metaphysical Interpretation’).
Some of speculative philosophy’s critics acknowledged that empirical evi-
dence bears upon it, but denied it any value qua search for truth. Stace is
an example; he held that the claims of speculative philosophy ‘are probably
bad, poor, amateurish science’ (Stace, ‘Can Speculative Philosophy be
Defended?’, 124). Reichenbach (The Rise of Scientific Philosophy) argues that
speculative philosophy makes use of superficial analogies and that these
lead to pseudo-explanations (Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy,
ch. 2). Proponents of this objection do not appear to engage with their
targets. Stace provides no argument for his assertion. Reichenbach, in turn,
ignores all twentieth-century speculative philosophy, including book-length
speculative work about when analogy can legitimately be used in philosophy
(e.g. Pepper, World Hypotheses; Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking)
and speculative use of hypothetico-deductive inference alongside analogy
and other forms of ampliative reasoning (e.g. Whitehead, Process and
Reality; Stedman, ‘A Defence of Speculative Philosophy’; and Pepper, World
Hypotheses).
Of course, arguments for specific critical approaches to philosophy as well
as the application of such approaches in trying to address long-standing phi-
losophical issues might be thought indirectly to undermine speculative phil-
osophy. For instance, in making his case for logical empiricism, Reichenbach
claims that it resolved many traditional philosophical issues, from the
problem of induction to the issue of the cognitive status of ethical claims
(Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, 307). But, as I noted with
regard to discussions of ordinary language philosophy in JoP, and as is
reflected in the short lives of logical positivism and logical empiricism, specific
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critical proposals for resolving philosophical issues, as well as which critical
approach was the right approach for philosophy, were hotly disputed, even
among analytic philosophers. Here too, on the face of things, no sufficiently
strong case against speculative philosophy appears to have been made.
Indeed, the absence of such a case is independently plausible. Katzav and
Vaesen (‘Pluralism and Peer Review’) argue that we still do not have a good
case for mainstream approaches to philosophy and that this is recognized
by many inheritors of the analytic tradition.
5. The nature of analytic philosophy (1925–69)
Section 4 focused primarily on the emergence and management of analytic
philosophy in Britain and America during the period 1925–69. I now focus
on the nature of analytic philosophy during this period. Katzav and
Vaesen’s documentation (‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’ and
‘Pluralism and Peer Review’) of how Mind and PR became analytic journals
shows the existence of institutionalized opposition to speculative philosophy
from as early as 1925; the evidence is that speculative philosophy was a major
part of what came to be excluded from these journals when they were taken
over by editors identified as analytic philosophers. In Sections 3 and 4, we saw
that the later takeovers of JoP and PQ were similar occasions for the exclusion
of speculative philosophy. My more preliminary examination of Analysis, PS
and APQ suggests that they were similarly disposed; indeed, Analysis’ found-
ing policy statement (Vol. 1(1)) is an extremely clear statement of its commit-
ment to critical philosophy. I have found no cases during the period 1925–69
in which a journal run by analytic philosophers was open to speculative phil-
osophy. This supports the characterization of analytic philosophy during the
period 1925–69 as a form of philosophy that, at an institutional level,
exerted a form of control over its rivals that bypassed discussion. Plausibly,
as we have seen, the reason for this sectarian behaviour was a commitment,
again at the institutional level, to the view that philosophy should be critical in
its approach.
My characterization of JoP’s 1950s and 1960s contents, especially of how
phenomenology and existentialism were excluded from the journal, also
allows me to say something about the species of critical philosophy that ana-
lytic philosophy was. The characterization suggests that analytic philosophy
was at the time a form of critical philosophy that excluded (at least) making
central use of detailed characterizations of experience in addressing philoso-
phical problems. This fits well not only with the absence of sustained phenom-
enological description from other analytic journals during the years at hand,
but also with what Katzav and Vaesen (‘Pluralism and Peer Review’, 3) tell
us about Mind; what was excluded from its pages in the mid-1920s included
philosophical psychology, and philosophical psychology shared with
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phenomenology and existentialism an emphasis on the detailed characteriz-
ation of experience as well as the influence of Franz Brentano (van der Schaar,
G. F. Stout and the Psychological Origins). An interesting question, which
cannot be addressed here, is to what extent analytic philosophy might,
during the period at hand, be further specified by its exclusion of forms of
critical philosophy other than those for which the detailed characterization
of experience was central. Another question which cannot be addressed
here is whether, as suggested by earlier work on PR (Katzav and Vaesen,
‘Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy’), analytic philosophy was also
characterized by a certain attitude towards normative issues.
The relatively pluralistic contents of Mind, PR, JoP, PPR and PQ prior to their
takeover by analytic philosophers suggests that, at an institutional level,
speculative philosophy was not, during the period under consideration and
if only in America and Britain, sectarian in the way that analytic philosophy
was. Even PPR under Farber, who was, recall, a phenomenologist of the critical
variety, was a relatively pluralist journal. To be sure, other critical philosophers
in America (see, e.g. Randall (‘Talking and Looking’) on the logical positivists,
and recall Cumming) may well have shared the sectarian attitude institutiona-
lized by analytic philosophers, but only analytic philosophers appear to have
institutionalized this attitude in a regular and effective way.
There is a straightforward connection between a commitment to critical
philosophy and sectarianism about philosophy. If philosophy should be criti-
cal, then philosophy should aim to avoid making its own substantive claims
about the world and its inhabitants; philosophy should try to avoid straying
beyond established opinion. Speculative philosophy, by contrast, is not com-
mitted to the view that critical philosophy should be avoided. On the con-
trary, examining the limits of established opinion would seem to be a
natural, or even unavoidable, part of trying to go beyond it. Indeed, de
Laguna (‘Speculative Philosophy’) argues that twentieth-century speculative
philosophy is, to a substantial extent, a reaction to twentieth-century critical
philosophy.
Of course, the extent to which a commitment to a specific critical philoso-
phical approach will lead to sectarianism depends on the strength of the com-
mitment and on available opportunities for controlling alternative
approaches. A strong degree of commitment, along with appropriate oppor-
tunities, are plausibly needed to explain the sectarian practices we have been
observing. A tentative or hedged commitment to critical philosophy, it would
seem, would allow, or even require, the survival of speculative philosophy.
Further, the conjunction of the high institutional confidence in critical phil-
osophy with the already noted apparent absence of sufficiently strong argu-
ments against speculative philosophy suggests that analytic philosophy can
perhaps be further characterized as a form of dogmatism, where dogmatism
is here understood to involve a degree of commitment to a position that goes
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beyond what is justified by evidence or argumentation. Deciding to what
extent such a characterization is justified requires, however, further examin-
ation of the case for critical philosophy.
6. Concluding discussion
We have seen that, during the period 1925–69, control of generalist journals in
America and Britain was systematically used to marginalize speculative philos-
ophy and other rivals to a relatively narrow, critical approach to philosophy,
one standardly called ‘analytic philosophy’. This suggested a view of the
nature of analytic philosophy at the time, one according to which it was, at
the institutional level, a sectarian, possibly dogmatic, form of critical philos-
ophy. My case here is thus in tension with views according to which analytic
philosophy never involved agreement about fundamental principles (e.g.
Preston, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, 4) and in the spirit of views according to
which philosophical approach did, in some sense, unify analytic philosophy
(e.g. Beaney, ‘What Is Analytic Philosophy?’).
We have also seen that the role of one candidate external influence on
Analytic philosophy’s growth, that is, McCarthyism, should be downplayed,
something that is in tension with the picture of this growth provided by
McCumber (Time in the Ditch and The Philosophy Scare) and Reisch (How the
Cold War). Nevertheless, the control of generalist philosophy journals in
America and Britain, perhaps alongside control of key philosophy depart-
ments, plausibly played an important role in explaining the growth of analytic
philosophy. Thus, the fundamental shift towards critical philosophy that came
with analytic philosophy was substantially externally driven. Indeed, it was, on
the face of things, not adequately justified. These conclusions are compatible
with their being important internal drivers behind the growth of analytic philos-
ophy, including with this growth being facilitated by an affinity between British
and American philosophy and/or by the philosophical merits of analytic philos-
ophy (for such views, see, e.g. Kuklick, ‘Philosophy and Inclusion’; Soames, ‘Ana-
lytic Philosophy in America’; Misak, The American Pragmatists; and Beaney, ‘The
Historiography of Analytic Philosophy’). Nevertheless, my conclusions do mean
that the growth of analytic philosophy was not, at bottom, a matter of mutual
understanding across the Atlantic or good philosophy.
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